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COMFORT ZONES
Typical FOMC member statements: 1 to 2 percent inﬂation
would be ideal.
“Small positive inﬂation is the best inﬂation target.”
Associated with short-term nominal interest rates near 5 percent.
Economic theory: nominal interest rates should be zero.
Why the difference?INTRODUCTION MAIN IDEAS ENVIRONMENT PLANNING PROBLEMS OPTIMUM INFLATION THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS CONCLUSIONS
THEORY AND REALITY: WHY THE DIFFERENCE?
Japan.
Summers (1991): Zero bound on nominal interest rates interferes
with stabilization policy.
Adam and Billi (2006).
Smith (2002). Deﬂation causes disintermediation, harming the
operation of credit markets.
We study a version of the latter:
A small amount of inﬂation “deepens ﬁnancial markets” in a way
we make precise.INTRODUCTION MAIN IDEAS ENVIRONMENT PLANNING PROBLEMS OPTIMUM INFLATION THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS CONCLUSIONS
WHAT WE DO
Endowment economy with constant aggregate income.
A continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households.
Endowments ﬂuctuate.
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AGENT TYPES
Households are divided into two types.
“Townsend-Bewley-type” or cash agents can only use currency in
nonnegative amounts to smooth consumption.
“Kehoe-Levine-type” or credit agents can participate in either
asset market subject to endogenous debt constraints.
Default is punished by perpetual exclusion from the loan market
but still permits defaulting households to hold nonnegative
currency.
Inﬂation will make default less attractive, loosening
participation constraints and strengthening the credit market.INTRODUCTION MAIN IDEAS ENVIRONMENT PLANNING PROBLEMS OPTIMUM INFLATION THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS CONCLUSIONS
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PREVIEW OF MAIN FINDINGS
We study a particular social planning problem, made precise
below.
Deﬂation is infeasible if the planner assigns positive weight to
credit households.
Inﬂation higher than the level required to slacken debt
constraints will not be chosen if the planner assigns sufﬁcient
weight to cash households.
If the planner puts a relative weight greater than zero but less
than the population weight on credit households, the optimum
inﬂation rate is positive.
Conclude: Independent central banks will set low positive
inﬂation targets in economies that possess highly developed
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RECENT RELATED LITERATURE
Aiyagari and Williamson (2000 JET).
Related environment, random endowments, outside option is
Bewley, emphasis on ﬁnancial intermediation, positive inﬂation
deters default, computational.
Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007 JET).
Related environment, Lagos-Wright, emphasis on ﬁnancial
intermediation, positive inﬂation deters default.
Ragot (2007). OLG framework.
Andolfatto (2007).
Antinolﬁ, Azariadis, and Bullard (2007).
Money is the only asset, emphasis on dynamics and equilibrium
selection.
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ENVIRONMENT
Continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households.
λ “Kehoe-Levine” or credit type agents.
1￿ λ “Townsend-Bewley” or cash type agents.
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ENDOWMENTS
Credit households are divided into two sub-types, 0 and 1, with
mass λ/2 each.
Cash households are divided into two sub-types, 2 and 3, with
mass 1￿ λ/2 each.














(1+ α,1￿ α) if t = 0,2,...
(1￿ α,1+ α) if t = 1,3,... (2)
α 2 (0,1) indexes the degree of income volatility.
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NATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Cash agents are anonymous households who may only use
currency to smooth income ﬂuctuations, as in Bewley (1980).
No claims can be enforced on them or by them.
The “unbanked.”
Credit agents may enter into loan arrangements to smooth
consumption subject to endogenous debt limits, as in Kehoe and
Levine (1993).
Credit agents who default are forever excluded from the loan
market and must instead use currency.
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THE MONETARY AUTHORITY, BRIEF VERSION
Benevolent social planner chooses a constant inﬂation rate at
which cash agents can trade ...
... and directly selects consumption vectors for credit agents who
may either accept their allocations or behave like cash agents in
perpetuity.
The inﬂation target in this economy is similar to an optimal tax
subject to an incentive constraint as understood by Mirrlees
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COSTS AND BENEFITS OF POSITIVE INFLATION
Positive rates of inﬂation impose a tax on cash agents ...
... and confer two beneﬁts on credit agents:
a transfer of resources from the cash sector, and
a reduction in the default payoff which brings about higher debt
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INFLATION TARGETING AS A PLANNING PROBLEM
Pure equal-treatment planning problem would choose a periodic
consumption sequence for each agent.
It would assign (cH,cL) to high income and low income credit
agents, and consumption (xH,xL) to the corresponding cash
agents.
Equivalent to lump-sum taxes on some agents and lump-sum
subsidies to others.
Because inﬂation is a distortionary tax, we deﬁne a modiﬁed
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MODIFIED PLANNING PROBLEM
First, the monetary authority sets a constant inﬂation factor π.
Next, given π, high income cash agents choose a periodic
consumption vector (xH,xL) ￿ 0 to maximize stationary
discounted utility
1
1￿ β2 [u(xH) + βu(xL)] (3)
subject to
xH ￿ 1+ α, (4)
xH + πxL = 1+ α + π (1￿ α), (5)
u(xH) + βu(xL) ￿ u(1+ α) + βu(1￿ α) (6)
(1) nonnegative currency; (2) money balances are used up to
smooth consumption in low income dates; (3) agents can
renounce money and consume endowments.INTRODUCTION MAIN IDEAS ENVIRONMENT PLANNING PROBLEMS OPTIMUM INFLATION THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS CONCLUSIONS
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MORE ON THE MODIFIED PLANNING PROBLEM
Let xH (π) and xL (π) solve the previous problem. Given π, the
planner now chooses consumption values (cH,cL) ￿ 0 for credit
households to maximize the equal-treatment welfare function
1
1￿ β2 [u(cH) + u(cL)] (7)
subject to the resource constraint
λ(cH + cL) + (1￿ λ)[xH (π) + xL (π)] = 2, (8)
and the participation constraint
u(cH) + βu(cL) ￿ u[xH (π)] + βu[xL (π)]. (9)
Equal treatment of high income and low income households
means that the discounted utilities are weighted equally. This
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MORE ON THE MODIFIED PLANNING PROBLEM
If cH (π) and cL (π) solve the previous problem for a given
π > 0, the planner selects the stationary inﬂation factor π to
maximize the social welfare function
W (π,δ) = δfu[cH (π)] + u[cL (π)]g
+ (1￿ δ)fu[xH (π)] + u[xL (π)]g. (10)
This SWF assigns equal weights to members of the same group
but potentially different weights to different groups.
A strictly utilitarian SWF would have equal weights for all, that
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This SWF assigns equal weights to members of the same group
but potentially different weights to different groups.
A strictly utilitarian SWF would have equal weights for all, that
is, δ = λ.INTRODUCTION MAIN IDEAS ENVIRONMENT PLANNING PROBLEMS OPTIMUM INFLATION THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS CONCLUSIONS
OPTIMUM INFLATION WITHOUT INCENTIVE
CONSTRAINTS
To build up intuition, we ﬁrst solve the planner’s problem
ignoring for the moment the incentive constraints.
We allow lump-sum income transfers.
The planner then maximizes the SWF subject to the economy’s
resource constraint.
This gives a ﬁrst best solution with π = β, RN = 1, and smooth
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SECOND BEST
Suppose that the planner cannot impose a lump-sum tax on any
agent but must instead use inﬂation or deﬂation and redistribute
the resulting seignorage from one group to another.
The planner must now choose (π,cH,cL) to solve the modiﬁed
planning problem, but still ignoring the incentive constraints.
Suppose δ = 1, no welfare weight on the cash community. Then
the planner chooses maximal seigniorage ˜ π and smooths the
consumption of the credit community completely.
Suppose δ = 0, no welfare weight on the credit community. Then
the planner will push the inﬂation factor as close to zero as
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MORE ON SECOND BEST
The second best trades off these two extreme cases.
THEOREM
The second best optimum allocation under a utilitarian social welfare
function satisﬁes (cH,cL,xH,xL) = (c￿￿,c￿￿,xH (π￿￿),xL (π￿￿)). It is
supported by a “modiﬁed Friedman rule” for some inﬂation factor
π￿￿ 2 (β,1), and a nominal yield such that RN = π￿￿/β > 1.
PROOF.
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KEY ASSUMPTIONS
A1. Income shares cannot be “too variable.”
A2. Income shares cannot be “too smooth.”
A3. It is within the power of the central planner to lower the rate
of return facing users of cash to the point where the incentive
constraint on credit users becomes slack.
Call the associated inﬂation factor ¯ π.
Perhaps more controversial?
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LEMMA 2
LEMMA
Deﬁne Wπ (π,δ) = ∂W/∂π. Then (a) Wπ (π,δ) < 0
8(π,δ) 2 [ ¯ π, ˜ π] ￿ [0,λ], and (b) limπ!1Wπ (π,δ) = +∞ when π
converges from above.
Part (a) intuition. To raise π above ¯ π does not improve the ability
of the planner to smooth the consumption of the credit
community any further. Doing so merely transfers income from
the cash community. This transfer will reduce social welfare
except when δ > λ.
Part (b) intuition. A small increase in the inﬂation tax creates a
credit market where one would otherwise not exist.INTRODUCTION MAIN IDEAS ENVIRONMENT PLANNING PROBLEMS OPTIMUM INFLATION THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS CONCLUSIONS
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LEMMA 3
LEMMA
W (π,δ) is not deﬁned for π < 1. It is decreasing in π for π 2 ( ˜ π,1/¯ R)
and constant for π ￿ 1/¯ R.
Deﬂation violates the participation constraint for high income
credit households.
The outcome of any deﬂation is that money has a higher payoff
than credit.INTRODUCTION MAIN IDEAS ENVIRONMENT PLANNING PROBLEMS OPTIMUM INFLATION THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS CONCLUSIONS
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THEOREM 4
THEOREM
Suppose assumptions A1, A2, and A3 hold, and 0 < δ ￿ λ. Then the
optimum inﬂation factor is π? (δ) > 1 and the associated nominal interest
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CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this paper, the optimal inﬂation target should strike a balance
between the deadweight loss from inﬂation and the potential
improvement in credit market conditions.
Main conclusion: independent central banks will set low positive
inﬂation targets in economies that possess highly developed
ﬁnancial markets.
U.S.A.: One to two percent.
Republic of South Africa: Three to six percent.
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